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1. Introduction 
The Joint Response Unit (JRU) in Gwent is a 
collaboration between Gwent Police and the 
Welsh Ambulance Service Trust (WAST). It was 
introduced in 2016 with the aim of jointly 
addressing and reducing demand on both 
organisations created by incidents attended by 
the police that required an ambulance and vice 
versa. The operation consists of an ambulance 
service vehicle, which is staffed by a 
professional paramedic and a member of the 
Gwent Police Special Constabulary. 
This evaluation is being conducted as part of the 
IPSCJ’s national pilot programme, which is 
funded by the Police Transformation Fund 
(PTF), looking at innovative practice in the use 
of volunteers within policing. 
The report provides a comprehensive review of 
the operation, which has been achieved through 
(i) a literature review, (ii) an overview of the 
national picture of Special Constables in joint 
operations with external organisations, (iii) 
analysis of key statistical data, (iv) semi-
structured interviews with staff and volunteers 
from both WAST and Gwent Police, and (v) a 
SWOT analysis of the JRU operation. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1  Policy Context 
Since 2010 the British government has 
supported the policy of emergency service 
collaboration between police, fire and rescue 
services and health services to improve 
efficiency in service delivery as well as service 
cost. Although there has been much debate over 
police-fire collaboration, the Home Office (2015: 
3) have stated explicitly that they: 
“…want to see Police and Crime 
Commissioners and NHS ambulance 
trusts working more closely together to 
ensure the demand that the police and 
NHS ambulance services place on each 
other, on a day-to-day basis, is dealt 
with in the most effective and efficient 
manner.”  
Moreover, the Wellbeing of Future Generations 
Act (2015) legislation from the Welsh Assembly 
supports the necessity of collaborations in 
pursuit of the economic, social, environmental 
and cultural wellbeing of Wales (Welsh 
Assembly, 2015). 
In 2013, the government published Sir Ken 
Knight’s ‘Facing the Future’ report into blue light 
collaboration (2013), which concluded that 
increased efficiency could be achieved, both in 
operational and financial terms, by embracing 
shared resources and interoperability, especially 
between police and fire and rescue services. The 
report did, however, highlight the added 
difficulty in achieving collaboration between the 
largely county-based police or fire services and 
the regional ambulance services (Knight, 2013). 
Currently, the most established model of 
collaborative working between police and health 
services in the UK is in joint response to mental 
health crisis, with many force areas having 
established mental health street triage (MHST) 
operations. MHST involves a healthcare 
professional in the response to incidents 
reported to the police involving mental health 
crisis, with the objective of making the process 
of deciding whether to detain an individual 
under section 136 of the Mental Health Act 
(1983) more efficient, reducing the 
inappropriate use of s136 detainments, and 
ensuring a more dignified process for the 
individual. As these operations are designed and 
delivered locally, there are a number of different 
models involving different combinations of 
professionals from various organisations, 
including police and community psychiatric 
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nurses (CPNs), police and paramedics, police 
with a CPN and a paramedic, and social workers 
and nurses (Callender et al., 2018; Lee et al., 
2015; Horspool et al., 2016; Keown et al., 2016; 
Bhardwa, 2013; Baraki et al., 2017; Reveruzzi & 
Pilling, 2016). 
An evaluation of the nine initial pilot sites across 
England and Wales in 2015 found that in all but 
two of the locations where MHST had been 
implemented, the number of detentions had 
decreased, and that the use of police cells for 
people detained under s136 had also declined 
(Home Office, 2016). Subsequently many more 
force areas have implemented MHST to deliver a 
joint response to mental health crisis in the 
community. 
2.2. Interoperability and 
collaboration in emergency services 
There are several examples of the development 
of interoperability within public service roles 
across the country, with automated external 
defibrillators (AEDs) being fitted in some police 
vehicles in the Met and City of London areas as 
well as Merseyside and Greater Manchester, 
with officers receiving training to use the 
equipment (ESCWG, 2016). Additionally, Greater 
Manchester Fire and Rescue Service now 
respond to 20% of cardiac arrests and are fully 
trained to use AEDs (ESCWG, 2016). This 
provides support for the North West Ambulance 
Service, especially during periods of high 
demand when an ambulance may take longer to 
arrive. A similar collaboration has taken place 
between Essex County Fire and Rescue Service 
and East of England Ambulance Service, 
whereby equipment and training are provided to 
the fire and rescue service to respond to 
incidents involving cardiac arrest, which has 
since been rolled out across a number of other 
counties in the East of England (ESCWG, 2016). 
Furthermore, there are examples of 
collaborations between public services the 
Metropolitan Police and London Ambulance 
Service (LAS) have a joint response unit (JRU) 
involving a LAS fast response vehicle staffed by 
one paramedic that responds solely to police 
requests for medical assistance (ESCWG, 2016). 
Over three quarters (79.3%) of incidents 
attended by the JRU vehicle did not require full 
ambulance attendance over the course of three 
years between 2012 and 2015 (ESCWG, 2016). 
Internationally, there are limited examples of 
joint response collaborations in literature. In the 
USA, a Domestic Violence Coordinated Response 
Team was established involving a police officer 
and a victim advocate as first responders to 
domestic violence incidents (Whetstone, 2001). 
This approach was considered to be more 
effective in improving the quality of life for 
victims of domestic violence (Whetstone, 2001), 
and subsequent different models of coordinated 
response to domestic violence cases have 
emerged in America (USDOJ, 2015). 
Charman (2013), when investigating 
compatibility and interoperability between police 
and ambulance staff, found that there was a 
‘natural affinity’ between the two groups and a 
mutual understanding of each others’ 
professional roles. Regular attendance at the 
same incidents meant that there was a natural 
overlap in working practices and a development 
of relationships, with some officers and 
ambulance staff describing a feeling of 
belonging to the ‘emergency services’ rather 
than to their individual organisations (Charman, 
2013). 
That said, much of the identified good practice 
regarding partnership working and joint 
response comes from the Mental Health Street 
Triage literature. Research and evaluations 
across a number of sites delivering MHST have 
broadly agreed that the success factors behind 
these joint operations include shared strategic 
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objectives, commitment of dedicated personnel 
to the operation, training of operational staff, 
officers, and volunteers to understand their roles 
comprehensively and the role of the 
professionals they are working alongside, and 
wider organisational acceptance of the 
operation’s objectives (Callender et al, 2018; 
Lee et al., 2015; Horspool et al., 2016; Keown 
et al., 2016; Bhardwa, 2013; Baraki et al., 2017; 
Reveruzzi & Pilling, 2016). 
2.3. Volunteers in Emergency 
Response Roles 
Volunteers are common in ambulance services 
around the world including in Europe and 
Australia (Ambulancezorg Nederland, 2010; 
O’Meara, 2003). Volunteer paramedics in 
Australia contribute 3 million hours per year 
(Busch, 2013) within a range of delivery models 
including independent emergency first 
responders and joint professional-volunteer 
ambulance crews (O’Meara, 2012; 2003). 
Ambulance and health-based volunteers in the 
UK contribute through several different 
organisations, including the regional ambulance 
services, which will train up volunteers to 
become community first responders who can be 
first on the scene at an emergency in their local 
community (EMAS, LAS, NWAS). The British Red 
Cross provides medical and emotional support in 
emergency situations, including following the 
London bombings in 2007, the Manchester 
Arena bombing in 2017, London Bridge and 
Borough Market terror attacks and the Grenfell 
Tower fire (Adamson, 2017; Adamson, 2018; 
Kerslake Report, 2018). Additionally, charities 
such as St. John’s Ambulance Service train 
volunteers to deliver emergency first aid and 
provide care to people at public events (St. 
John’s Ambulance, 2019). 
In Japan, there are 888,900 volunteer 
firefighters, almost six times the number of 
career firefighters (157,860), and 96% of the 
nearly 2000 municipalities across the country 
have a volunteer fire service (Haddad, 2010). 
This is explained by a historic (albeit declining) 
pressure for men to join a volunteer fire 
department out of a civic responsibility that 
derives from the previous national service 
model, which results in volunteer firefighters 
obtaining a high social status, especially in rural 
communities (Haddad, 2010). Somewhat 
conversely, in the UK, there are a reported 
18,000 ‘Retained Firefighters’. Like British Army 
reserves, Retained Firefighters are paid for their 
time either on-call or attending incidents, but 
are mostly people who work and attend 
incidents when they occur. They are mostly 
based in rural areas out of a solely retained fire 
station, however, some work alongside full-time 
firefighters in urban areas (Fire Service, 2019). 
O’Meara (2012) identifies four components that 
contribute towards successful use of volunteers 
in the ambulance/first responder context:  
• Leadership, i.e. high levels of commitment to 
the integration of volunteers;  
• Integrative processes, i.e. salaried and 
volunteer staff receiving the same information 
and recognition;  
• Resource commitment, i.e. committing 
considerable resources to managing and 
supporting volunteers, and;  
• Relative autonomy, i.e. ensuring volunteers 
feel that they have an independent voice and 
can speak on behalf of the local community. 
Additionally, Fahey et al. (2003) highlighted high 
quality training that can be delivered flexibly as 
a key to volunteer ambulance officer retention, 
with inflexible, poor quality training as a large 
disincentive for both recruitment and retention. 
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Chandan & Meakin (2016) found that many 
Special Constables were likely to acknowledge 
the broader public safety responsibility of their 
role in responding to emergencies and being 
able to deliver first aid. However, levels of 
confidence varied significantly, with some 
expressing a preference for trained professionals 
to deliver emergency first aid. The factors 
influencing a Special Constable’s confidence in 
delivering emergency first aid included their 
personal or professional background, their level 
of experience in the role, having another officer 
or Special Constable present, and the training or 
refresher training that they had received 
(Chandan & Meakin, 2016). 
Overall, the literature demonstrates that the 
concept of joint response is a new and emerging 
field. The use of volunteers in emergency 
response roles is not necessarily new, but there 
is only a limited evidence-base to draw from in 
developing operations such as the joint response 
unit in Gwent. The policy context is particularly 
relevant in driving these types of collaborations, 
with cuts to funding and the requirement for 
greater efficiency necessitating new ways of 
working, including innovative practice in the use 
of volunteers and partnership working across 
agencies who share similar organisational 
challenges.
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3. National Picture 
This chapter provides a brief overview of how 
Special Constables are being deployed in 
collaborations with partner organisations outside 
of the police. The graphic below provides details  
 
of nine such operations across England and 
Wales, including the JRU in Gwent. 
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All of the collaborations illustrated in Figure 3.1 
involve Special Constables working alongside 
healthcare professionals. In all but one of the 
examples it is an ambulance service as the 
partner organisation.  The operations are at 
various stages of development, with the longest-
running collaboration having been introduced in 
2006, however, there appears to be consistency 
across their aim and objectives, with the idea 
being to attend incidents that would require 
both police and a paramedic to respond to and 
thereby reduce the pressure on police and 
ambulance services at times of peak demand. 
The role of the Special Constable varies across 
operations. In a minority of areas, the Special 
Constable carries out the role of designated and 
qualified driver to respond to incidents, whereas 
in most cases the paramedic carries out that 
function. In all of the collaborations, the Special 
Constable’s responsibility was seen to be to 
manage public order issues so that the 
paramedic can carry out their role safely. Some 
areas also highlighted the police powers, such 
as section 136, that the Special Constable can 
utilise if necessary as an important contribution 
to the operation. 
Most of the areas with collaborative operations 
have a dedicated team of Special Constables 
who are responsible for staffing the operation. 
The number of Specials on the team varied 
between 6 and 12. This range appears to suit 
the limited number of days that the 
collaborations are operational for each week, 
with most of them only being active at the 
weekends to address times of peak demand. 
Due to the differing levels of establishment, 
some areas are currently seeking to maintain 
their operations, whereas other are looking to 
scale up from pilot operations in narrower 
localities to cover a larger area. There is a 
consensus that these kinds of collaboration 
provide valuable support and ease demand for 
both police and ambulance services and 
therefore none of the force areas are seeking to 
reduce or cease their joint response operations. 
Whilst there are variations in the specifics of 
how each operation is delivered, there is a clear 
pattern in terms of the use of volunteers and 
weekend operating hours seeking to address 
peak demand. Some of the more established 
models could provide a valuable source of 
learning for developing operations.  
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4. Statistical 
Findings 
This chapter provides an overview of the data 
available for the Gwent Joint Response Unit. All 
findings represent data from between August 
2017 and July 2018. The graphs included below 
will provide an insight into the types of incidents 
that provided the highest level of demand for 
the JRU as well as some of the activity of the 
JRU in dealing with those incidents. 
Figure 4.1 shows the number of shifts that were 
completed over the course of a twelve-month 
period between August 2017 and July 2018. In 
only five of the twelve months were all shifts 
completed. This demonstrates some potential 
issues around the staffing of the JRU vehicle, 
which are explored further in chapter 5. There is 
a concerning trend of an increasing percentage 
of lost shifts. 
Almost half of all the incidents attended by the 
JRU were category ‘amber 2’, as displayed in 
figure 4.2, with ‘amber 1’, ‘amber 2’, and ‘green
Figure 4.1: Shifts completed vs shifts lost (Aug 2017-July 
2018) 
2’ category incidents accounting for almost 90% 
of all JRU deployments. While the JRU is 
required to attend ‘red’ calls if it is the closest 
deployable asset, its purpose is to attend lower 
priority incidents, and this demonstrates that it 
appears to be operating as intended. 
Figure 4.3 shows that the outcome of almost 
half of the JRU’s deployments was the 
conveyance of a patient to an appropriate 
health-based location for further treatment. It 
should be noted that the conveyance shown in 
this graph is the combined conveyance figure 
for those conveyed by the JRU, ambulance, taxi, 
etc. In over a fifth of incidents, the paramedic 
was able to treat the patient at the scene. These 
two outcomes account for 70% of incidents. 
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Figure 4.2: JRU incidents attended by category 
Figure 4.3: Outcome of incident 
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In almost 60% of cases, when conveyance was 
required, the JRU was able to fulfil that duty, 
enabling, in many cases, an ambulance to 
released to attend other calls. Figure 4.5 shows 
that the Royal Gwent Hospital in Newport was 
the destination in the majority of incidents 
where the JRU conveyed a patient with Prince 
Charles Hospital and Nevill Hall Hospital 
accounting for 30% of conveyances combined. 
Figure 4.4: Breakdown of how patients were conveyed 
when JRU attended 
The JRU’s demand is primarily driven by 
assaults, psychiatric problems, traffic collisions 
and overdoses, as displayed in Figure 4.6. These 
four incident types account for almost 65% of 
the overall activity of the JRU. This statistic can 
inform an important conversation around 
whether the JRU should be more focused 
around attending specific incident types only, 
and if so what it is best equipped to respond to 
effectively.
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Figure 4.5: Breakdown of JRU conveyance destination  
Figure 4.6: Breakdown of JRU deployments by incident 
type 
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Figure 4.7 shows the outcomes for the top six 
incident types when the JRU attends (these six 
incident types were chosen due to the sample 
size). The JRU was able to treat patients at the 
scene in a significantly higher proportion of 
traffic collisions compared with other incident 
types. It is also clear from this data that the 
JRU’s role in mental health related incidents is 
as a vehicle for conveyance, with both 
psychiatric problem and overdose showing a 
limited proportion of patients treated at the 
scene.
Figure 4.7: Outcome for top six incident types 
In reality, The analysis shows that more detailed 
data capturing systems are required in the JRU 
to evidence the impact of the JRU on the 
outcomes for patients and quality of service as 
well as the cost benefits for both the police and 
ambulance services. Existing mental health 
street triage operations may be a useful as a 
starting point for building a system for 
monitoring the process for each incident and 
providing measures for impact and success 
going forward. 
This data provides only an overview of the 
activity of the JRU. These may, in some cases, 
provide a starting point for important 
conversations around the JRU’s aims and 
objectives and its operational focus, leadership 
and future development. These topics are 
explored with the volunteers and professionals 
who have been involved with the JRU in the 
next chapter.  
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5. Qualitative 
Themes 
This chapter explores the qualitative themes 
arising from semi-structured interviews 
conducted with strategic leads across Gwent 
Constabulary and WAST, as well as paramedics 
and Special Constables who have worked on the 
Joint Response Unit. In total, eleven interviews 
were conducted. The interviews involved 
discussions around the aims and purpose of the 
JRU, its impact in relation to those stated aims 
as well as the impact on partnership working 
and the experiences of being a Special 
Constable in a cross-agency environment. 
The first section of this chapter will therefore 
discuss the some of the key themes emerging 
from the interviews, including the JRU’s aims 
and purpose, perceptions of its value across the 
organisations involved, the experiences of 
partnership working, management (including 
training), and strategic leadership. The second 
section looks in detail at the role and 
experiences of Special Constables within the 
JRU, including the idea of specialisms within the 
Special Constabulary, management of 
expectations and abilities, and the impact of the 
Specials on the role and of the role on the 
Specials. The final section of this chapter will 
involve a ‘SWOT’ analysis to identify the 
perceived strengths, weaknesses, opportunities 
and threats in relation to the JRU and will 
explore ideas of the future development and 
sustainability of the operation. 
5.1.  Key perspectives 
5.1.1 Aims and purpose of the JRU 
There were several aims of the Joint Response 
Unit identified during the interviews. Views 
appeared to vary as to whether the service the 
JRU delivers is intended to provide primary care 
to members of the public or secondary support 
to relieve regular officers from the scenes of 
healthcare-related incidents. Connected to this 
issue was the discussion around whether the 
demand that the JRU addresses is too broad, 
with it originally having been designed to 
respond to assaults and RTIs. There were a 
variety of opinions on what kind of incidents the 
JRU should attend and how it could best 
contribute to reducing demand across both 
Gwent Constabulary and WAST. 
One of the key aims of the JRU identified by 
those involved was its function for freeing up 
regular police officers to deal with demand. 
Often when there has been an incident involving 
a paramedic, a police officer will be required to 
stay on the scene until it is fully resolved and 
therefore cannot respond to other incidents. The 
JRU is considered to have been effective in 
attending these incidents and releasing regular 
officers and ambulances so that they are 
available to be deployed elsewhere. 
“As a Police Officer [when I request an 
ambulance], the waiting time’s 
horrendous.  It could be two, three, four 
hours before one turns up so the Unit 
was designed really so if there was a call 
where an ambulance was requested 
from a Police Officer that we will attend 
in place of the ambulance initially, to 
take over that call and the Police 
Officers on scene if I can.” – Special 
Constable 
 
“There was an awful problem and still is 
an awful problem with ambulance 
waiting times, so Officers can be waiting 
for hours for ambulances to arrive.  So, 
this was kind of a shortcut to that, 
whereby the JRU could go along and 
patch somebody up and wait for the 
ambulance to arrive, so freeing up an 
Officer.” – Regular officer 
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Similarly, it was perceived by other that the JRU 
intends to provide vital support to respond to 
WAST incidents, allowing for a paramedic to be 
on the scene of an incident rapidly and with the 
protection of the police presence, rather than 
making individuals in distress wait for hours to 
receive medical attention through the 
deployment of a full ambulance.  
“…rather than send an ambulance 
resource, we will go initially to the call 
and if we require backup then we’d say 
to the ambulance service that we need 
an emergency ambulance.” – Special 
Constable 
 
“…from a safety point of view, going in 
to pubs, nightclubs etc., or when you are 
attending things like that, there is a dual 
function.  The Paramedic can be dealing 
with one element whilst the Police 
Officer is dealing with the other, 
meaning that an Ambulance and a 
response unit are not getting tied up 
with those smaller calls and they can 
deal with other stuff.” – Special 
Constable 
 
“First and foremost, it was to ensure 
that the service users received the best 
response that we could provide, which 
was typically to respond as quickly as 
possible to any need that they had.” – 
Special Constable 
This range of views on the aims demonstrates 
the idea that the JRU serves the purposes of 
supporting both police and ambulance services. 
In most cases, those involved with the JRU 
acknowledged its dual function of providing high 
quality primary care with a quicker response 
while playing a supporting role in allowing other 
resources to be deployed more effectively.  
“It is a more effective use of our 
resources.  An effective use of both 
Ambulance and Police resources, which 
means then that both Ambulance and 
Police are in a position where they can 
be freed up to deal with more pressing 
matters.” – Regular officer 
 
 “We respond specifically to requests 
from either service requesting the other, 
so police requesting ambulance or 
ambulance requesting police, or 
incidents where it’s immediately 
foreseeable that both police and 
ambulance will be required, at things 
like RTCs, assaults.” – Paramedic 
 
“…to attend calls that require a Police 
Response and an Ambulance Response 
and it needs to meet both of those 
criteria.” – Special Constable 
However, it was at times unclear whether this 
was considered to be the operation’s intended 
objectives at the outset or just a result of the 
lack of clarity and awareness of the JRU within 
the force control room/ambulance control room. 
This issue will be discussed later in this chapter. 
The types of incidents that the JRU was 
reported to be deployed to are widely varying in 
range, however, there was consensus that the 
main demand experience comes from drug and 
alcohol related incidents, assaults, road traffic 
collisions, and incidents involving mental health 
distress. 
There are different views within the operation 
regarding what the JRU should be used for and 
how it might be most effectively deployed. It is 
currently seen as an effective way of ‘clearing 
the stacks’ by attending any lower priority 
incidents that an ambulance might not reach for 
a number of hours. 
“…we go to calls where youngsters have 
had too much to drink and rather than 
waste the resource again of an 
emergency ambulance, we can have a 
look at this youngster, call the parents 
and most of the time parents will come 
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down and say, ‘I’ll take him home’.” – 
Special Constable 
 
“Yes, it’s a very broad generalist 
specialty in the way that we respond to 
pretty much anything and everything 
but with a focus on what the police 
would come into contact with, such as 
assaults, substance abuse, RTCs.” – 
Paramedic 
However, the argument was made that 
deploying the JRU vehicle is not the appropriate 
response to incidents involving mental health 
crisis, as the paramedic is not the correct 
healthcare practitioner to deal with mental 
health. This has, at times, caused conflict 
between the Special Constable and the 
paramedic regarding whether to deploy to these 
incident types. 
“A gentleman was on the wrong side of 
the bridge, threatening to jump off and 
we were the first unit by quite some 
distance.  Instinctively, from my point of 
view, it’s to get up on to the top of the 
bridge to speak to the gentleman to try 
and bring him down.  Whereas the 
Paramedic’s point of view was, ‘Well, 
I’m no use up there, I’m better use 
down here so when he does jump, I can 
start doing the work on him’.” – Special 
Constable 
Prior to developing the broad remit that it now 
has though, the JRU was originally intended to 
deal only with RTCs and assaults, and some of 
the people interviewed felt that it would be 
more effective if it returned to being a niche 
service for particular incident types. 
“Initially it was a good idea around 
assaults in the main, traffic accidents – 
probably more assaults if I’m honest…” 
– Regular officer 
 
“I just wonder if JRU can be more 
targeted to the growing demands 
around mental health, maybe.” – 
Regular officer 
The JRU is considered to be effective in 
addressing a broad range of incidents and in 
doing so, helping to reduce the demand on 
ambulances and police officers alike. However, 
the conflict arising over whether it is appropriate 
to attend mental health related incidents raises 
questions over whether the JRU vehicle should 
have a narrower focus that would help to clarify 
its overall purpose. 
5.1.2 Value 
It was perceived that the JRU was considered to 
be a highly valuable resource among Gwent 
Constabulary, and Special Constables in 
particular reported a high value placed on 
developing their skills and knowledge It was felt 
though that the operation was less valuable to 
WAST. There was a feeling across participants 
that there is untapped potential within the JRU, 
and that this potential could be achieved 
through a more formal approach to tasking and 
deployment. 
The JRU is valued by the wider police force for a 
number of reasons, the main one being that it 
provides relief for regular officers to attend 
other incidents. Specials who have worked on 
the JRU have noticed an increase in officers 
requesting support from the JRU vehicle over 
the radio as awareness of the operation and its 
remit improves. 
“The Officers request us because they 
know what we can do, they know we 
can get there quicker…” – Special 
Constable 
 
“once they know we’re on the system 
you can be called time after time after 
time.  The Regulars think it’s really good 
because again it releases them back into 
their normal day job because some of 
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them, as I said, they are with some of 
these people three, four, five, six hours. 
Whereas if we turn up we can discharge 
or take them in.” – Special Constable 
Conversely though, it was perceived that the 
Ambulance Service did not hold the JRU is such 
high regard. It was thought that the benefits to 
WAST were softer and therefore more difficult 
to quantify and that it was sometimes viewed as 
merely depriving the organisation of an 
ambulance driver for a shift. 
“…from the Ambulance side of things, 
they have invested time, money and 
resources into it.  My viewpoint from the 
Policing side is that they have invested 
little to nothing in it, but have reaped 
the benefits.” – Special Constable 
 
“The Paramedic is paid for on overtime 
and there seems to be a lack of 
understanding of how they can build 
that JRU into an existing shift pattern.  
And, that might mean dropping a rapid 
response vehicle on a Friday, Saturday 
and Sunday, to allow the JRU to 
operate.” – Regular officer 
 
“People don’t necessarily, from the 
ambulance side point of view, see the 
benefit of having a JRU, having 
paramedics taken off the coal face to fit 
into this more specialised role.” - 
Paramedic 
However, it was felt that the JRU was not 
maximising its potential due to some issues 
around the way in which it is tasked and 
deployed. A theme emerged from the 
participants that improvements are required 
regarding how decisions are made on which 
incidents to attend, this was partly put down to 
the lack of formal processes put in place to 
allocate incidents to the JRU. 
“They never had an allocation process 
given to them in the Control Room for 
the JRU, it’s always been self-allocation 
up until now.” – Ambulance service 
 
“The JRU was never intending to be self-
tasking and it has become self-tasking 
because neither Control Room has a 
system in place to automatically allocate 
the JRU to calls that are appropriate for 
it, so it’s pot luck as to who is in the 
Control Room that day, who has a good 
knowledge of the JRU and what it can 
do.” – Special Constable 
Additionally, awareness in the control rooms 
about when the JRU is available and what kind 
of incidents it should be deployed to was 
considered to be lacking. This was partly 
attributed to the JRU only being operational on 
three nights of the week. 
 “…our Control Rooms don’t have 
enough knowledge about how the JRU 
works, so they sometimes struggle what 
calls we should be allocated to.  And I 
think that comes with the fact that we 
don’t work in the weekdays, it’s only on 
the weekends, so sometimes they can 
forget.” – Special Constable 
 
“Are they being used to the best of their 
ability? Probably not… …there is a bit of 
internal marketing that could be done 
by the force specifically for using the 
JRU better.” – Regular officer 
Overall, the JRU is valued but could be achieving 
more with more formal structures in place and 
oversight within a control room, whether it is a 
police or ambulance control room. This analysis 
reflects the feeling among those interviewed 
that there is currently a lack of direction in 
terms of recognising these issues and 
addressing them as discussed in the next 
section. 
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5.1.3 Strategic and operational drift 
There was a consistent feeling that the JRU is 
currently suffering from a lack of direction in the 
interviews. The common view was that after a 
promising beginning, the operation had 
stagnated due to not putting systems in place to 
measure activity and failing to take opportunities 
to benefit from shared learning with similar 
operations in different localities, thereby missing 
multiple opportunities to learn and grow. Much 
of this can be attributed to how the JRU is 
managed across the organisations. 
Although it was considered to be having a 
positive impact on the ground, it was perceived 
that the JRU had not developed or changed the 
way it operates much in the time that it has 
existed. 
“Avon and Somerset have just started 
theirs, they’ve got two now.  South 
Wales have done theirs.  It works 
everywhere. But we seem to be stuck, 
we seem to be stuck with this unit that, 
we’re not progressing with it any 
further.  That’s what I see.” – Special 
Constable 
 
“I think we should have definitely 
expanded much bigger and much more 
rapid than we have…” – Paramedic  
There was concern though about the lack of 
strategic direction both from within Gwent Police 
and WAST, and that this could threaten the 
sustainability of the JRU. 
“I’m not really sure who manages it 
properly from WAST… …it’s lacking, if 
I’m honest, that someone taking hold of 
it and making sure that it’s a solid unit, 
these days.” – Special Constable 
 
“I think there does need to be more co-
ordination from both Welsh Ambulance 
Service and us about what its core role 
is.” – Regular officer 
 
“…there were a number of reasons to 
why [the JRU hasn’t grown].  A lot of 
them are stemming, unfortunately, from 
the ambulance service point of view and 
I think this falls back down to that view 
that our middle management have of 
us.” – Paramedic  
It was apparent from interviews that 
opportunities to assess and demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the JRU had been missed due to 
not putting in place systems to measure impact 
and outcomes at an early stage of the 
operation, and that this created difficulties in 
making the arguments for continued or 
increased investment in the future of the JRU. 
“We never seemed to do any sort of ROI 
or benefit realisation or anything like 
that really.  And a lot of that might come 
down to the fact that we haven’t got 
systems in place to allow us to report on 
that.” – Special Constable 
 
“what is concerning to me is that neither 
organisation – Welsh Ambulance or 
Gwent Police – have done any sort of 
evaluation around its impact.  It’s all 
been anecdotally.” – Regular officer 
 
“…it’s not very well measured from our 
side of things and it’s hard for them to 
gauge success from a statistical point of 
view, in terms of Officer time saved.” – 
Special Constable 
Moreover, no attempts had been made to liaise 
with neighbouring forces to share learning and 
improve the JRU. Specifically, WAST are 
collaborating with South Wales Police to run a 
Joint Response Unit, and yet there has been no 
reported communication regarding best practice. 
“Because there are so many JRUs 
popping up nationally across England 
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and Wales, there needs to be some co-
ordination from someone to join the co-
ordinators together across the whole of 
England and Wales and share 
experiences as to what we’re doing and 
between the lot of us, agree that there 
are some pros, there are some cons and 
just better ourselves really.” – Special 
Constable 
 
“…all the time I’m seeing on Twitter 
there’s more and more JRUs popping up 
and it would be good to compare the 
differences between them to see what 
they’re doing maybe extra that we could 
do.  Or just how they work in 
comparison.” – Special Constable 
 
“…we are neighbours with Avon and 
Somerset and they are also piloting a 
JRU and we cross over with Dyfed at the 
top, Dyfed Powys, and Gloucestershire 
Police.  So if we could - there is an 
opportunity for some join learning there, 
I think, in terms of their Joint Response 
Units.” – Special Constable 
There were comments from some participants 
that winning awards had caused complacency in 
terms of seeking how improvements could still 
be made to the operating model of the JRU and 
potentially ignoring some of the risks to the 
sustainability of the collaboration. 
“Obviously for the first 12 months we 
were a whirlwind of awards and 
commendations and handshakes and 
press cuttings.  And what we should 
have done then is expanded 
aggressively in my opinion…” – 
Paramedic 
 
“When there are lots of awards, it looks 
very shiny, but I think there are some 
strong cracks under the foundations.” – 
Special Constable 
 
“I think what they have done very well, 
is they have nominated it for all these 
awards and got carried away with the 
glamour of having awards and going to 
these nice dinners.  And, I think we have 
missed a trick in doing the basics in 
really marketing it to our control room 
and to the Welsh Ambulance Service 
control room, looking at how these calls 
are allocated.” – Regular officer 
Management was seen as a key issue in the lack 
of direction experienced by the JRU. In 
particular, it was felt that WAST were not 
invested in the operation at a management 
level. It was also apparent that management of 
the JRU within the police force was left to the 
Special Constabulary, and therefore there was 
no one taking responsibility for the operation 
within the force control room. Additionally, it 
was felt that a link between the force control 
room and the WAST control room would be 
beneficial to the management of the JRU. 
WAST were seen as reluctant participants in the 
JRU at times, with paramedics unclear as to 
whether it was preferable for them to be 
working on the JRU or manning a full 
ambulance. In particular, WAST’s middle-
management were identified as barriers to the 
JRU’s ability to operate consistently, with reports 
of shift being cancelled because of the lack of a 
paramedic becoming more regular in recent 
months. 
“The feeling I am getting that because 
WAST are paying overtime for this to 
happen, I just don’t see the enthusiasm 
there at the middle to senior 
management level, for this to continue.” 
– Regular officer 
 
“The last ten shifts I’ve put myself down 
for and we’re ready to come in and do, I 
reckon only four of them I’ve actually 
done.  That’s because WAST 
management can’t pull their fingers out 
really and get their paramedics on 
[shift].” – Special Constable 
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“At the moment we’ve only got two 
people that are operational on the 
vehicle and that’s me and Tim, are the 
only two that do it semi regular.  And 
because of that we’re suffering the 
consequences of it not being staffed…” 
– Paramedic 
 
“there was a frozen middle, so there was 
appetite from him and the Chief 
Constable and the Police and Crime 
Commissioner in Gwent. Yet, there is 
this struggle then at Area/Group 
Manager Level in the Welsh Ambulance 
Service to make this work” – Regular 
officer 
A part of the issue around staffing the JRU 
vehicle with a paramedic was put down to the 
fact that it is currently not possible for WAST to 
include it on their regular shift rota, which 
means that the operation relies on the ability 
and willingness of paramedics to do overtime, 
and the willingness of managers within WAST to 
allow it. This issue, however, is due to be 
addressed in an upcoming WAST ‘roster review’. 
“There doesn’t seem to be any co-
ordination from them around a rota 
system that is built in to their existing 
plans that is sustainable.  This is 
goodwill from a number of Paramedics 
to make this happen.” – Regular officer 
 
“…we have looked at ways of 
incorporating it into our RRV rotas and 
into our personal rotas and it all just 
gets very messy.” – Paramedic  
 
“…we couldn’t incorporate anything into 
the roster unit the roster review process 
began.  Now it has begun, we can devise 
a roster for the Caerphilly station where 
the JRU is considered within that…” – 
Ambulance service 
Furthermore, it was unclear as to who had 
overall ‘ownership’ of the JRU. It appeared to be 
driven from within the Special Constabulary 
from a police perspective and largely by willing 
paramedics on the WAST side of the 
collaboration. However, it was perceived that 
more stable and constant leadership was 
required within both organisations, and that 
communication between those operational leads 
would improve the JRU. 
“We answer to our project lead who 
then answers to the Director of Ops.  
Completely misses out the three, four, 
five levels of middle management in 
between.  Which we are obviously 
operating in their area… …but they have 
no input in what we say or do or how we 
operate and what we do.  That’s 
definitely caused us some issues and 
definitely is one of the key threats 
towards the Unit at the moment.” – 
Paramedic 
 
“The Police management has been 
somewhat patchy as well, in terms of 
organising training and filling the Unit 
with the Officers needed.  So, it is 
probably not particularly stable… …at 
the moment, it’s drifting.  There is a 
weakness in management on both 
sides.” – Special Constable 
 
“The lack of management across the 
whole structure has always been of 
concern to me.  We need somebody who 
can manage both sides of the fence 
when it comes to this Unit or two 
people, one either side, that are 
collaboratively working a lot closer 
together.” – Special Constable 
The control rooms of the police and the 
ambulance service were also thought to be 
lacking in communication that could provide 
important direction in terms of how the JRU is 
utilised. There were suggestions that a member 
of staff from the WAST control room could 
operate from within the force control room to 
provide oversight of the JRU. 
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“The two Control Rooms don’t 
communicate well with each other.  I 
don’t know what their working 
relationship is like, but from what we 
have seen on the JRU they don’t 
communicate brilliantly with one 
another, which is difficult for us.” – 
Special Constable 
 
“I think that will become an awful lot 
better when we get a member of the 
Welsh Ambulance Service within our 
control room, because there are plans 
for us to have that – I’m not sure what 
rank or what qualification the Officer 
will have – a member of the Welsh 
Ambulance Service to be working 
alongside our control room operators, 
very much like we’ve got mental health 
teams in there.” – Regular officer 
Overall, those involved, especially the Special 
Constables, are proud of the impact that the 
JRU appears to have. The lack of an ability to 
evidence the specific impact is, however, a 
serious risk when it comes to attempting to 
secure future support, funding and growth. 
Furthermore, on the police side of the 
collaboration, the JRU appears to require 
ownership beyond the Special Constabulary in 
order to ensure consistency of management and 
direction. While the JRU has brought the two 
organisations together, there appears to be an 
imbalance in the desire to progress the JRU, and 
this will be explored further in the next section. 
5.1.4 Strengthened partnership 
The police and ambulance services share many 
of the same organisational challenges and often 
respond to the same incidents. The JRU was 
therefore considered to be a logical way of 
collaborating. Although there are obvious 
differences in the roles carried out at incidents, 
Specials benefitted from being more actively 
involved, with more information, enabling them 
to feel like they are doing a better job. There 
was a feeling though that although the strategic 
collaboration had been effective in implementing 
the JRU, the collaboration at operational 
management level was lacking. 
Both the police and ambulance services share 
similar organisational challenges in terms of 
trying to maximise service delivery on limited 
budgets. At a strategic level, both Gwent Police 
and WAST representatives felt that the JRU 
provided good opportunity to address demand 
for both services. 
“When I have been out with the JRU I 
have found it to be very effective and 
efficient in responding to mental health 
calls for service.  Those people have had 
the most appropriate care from both 
Police and Paramedics.” – Regular 
officer 
 
“The fact that we have got crossed 
skilled people joining up to provide 
better services to the public, is never 
going to be a bad thing.” – Special 
Constable 
 
“The plan was to reduce demand and 
ease pressures and we’ve stuck very 
well to that.” – Paramedic  
Furthermore, the personal and working 
relationships between Special Constables and 
paramedics was reported to be very productive, 
with both Specials and paramedics keen to learn 
from each other about the responsibilities of the 
roles, and a potential secondary benefit of 
improved medical knowledge across policing 
that is reducing demand on the ambulance 
service. 
“And I’ve got to say that the team, 
between the ten Specials and the five 
paramedics, the working relationship is 
superb.  Everyone’s friends and people 
are eager to learn.  And some of the 
paramedics are also eager to learn some 
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of the Special Constabulary’s 
responsibilities as well so there’s a 
knowledge transfer, a skills transfer to a 
certain extent. And it’s really beneficial.” 
– Special Constable 
 
“We’ve also found that thorough their 
knowledge and understanding of what 
our roles are, we’ve potentially managed 
to reduce the amount of calls we’ve had 
from the police to just check people 
over.” – Paramedic  
 
“I personally reckon we’ve got a good 
team and we all get on really well.  We 
couldn’t ask for a better understanding 
of the paramedic service.” – Special 
Constable 
In addition to this, it was perceived by both 
sides of the collaboration that the increase in 
understanding of the pressures of each 
organisation was an important benefit of the 
JRU, resulting in less resentment when there are 
long waits for deployments and more 
understanding of processes and procedures. 
“There’s been times when we’ll take a 
patient down to the hospital and there’s 
been ambulances stuck outside there for 
three hours, just waiting to offload their 
patient, it’s incredible.  So I relay that 
on to other people so it changes their 
views… …if they’re frustrated or 
annoyed they’re been waiting [for an 
ambulance] so long I say, ‘It’s not the 
ambulance service’s fault, they haven’t 
got enough staff’.” – Special Constable 
 
“There is a definite rub between the 
police and the ambulance service when 
it comes to officers on the ground, 
because officers get frustrated by 
waiting times for ambulances and this 
goes some way to building up 
relationships between people 
operationally and they can recognise 
that the services are doing their best to 
try and help each other out.” – Regular 
officer 
 
“As to what I’ve gained, it’s definitely a 
better understanding of how they 
operate, their roles, risks and 
responsibilities in safely non-conveying 
when leaving people at home, which 
obviously had more of a legal 
underpinning than mine.” – Paramedic  
Overall, the organisations seem to be a good 
match to collaborate in an operation like the 
JRU, and there appear to be strong examples of 
the them pulling in the same direction at 
strategic and street-level to achieve similar 
objectives in terms of addressing demand. 
However, the reported lack of operational 
leadership at the middle-management-level 
provides some explanation for the feeling in the 
previous section of a lack of direction, which 
could provide a significant risk for the future of 
the JRU. 
5.2.  The experience of Special 
Constables 
5.2.1 Specialisms 
The JRU creates a specialism within Gwent 
Special Constabulary. This created a range of 
different impacts on the identity of Specials and 
the need to be conscious of the risk of being 
seen as separate or different from other 
Specials. There was a perception that being a 
part of the JRU was perceived as more exciting 
than regular Special Constabulary duties, and 
that while this was seen as a potential 
motivation for people to volunteer their time, it 
also created a risk to relationships within the 
Special Constabulary due to potential 
resentment and therefore to attrition rates in 
the longer-term. 
It was felt that shifts on the JRU were 
considered more exciting by Specials than their 
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routine duties, and this came across strongly 
among the Specials and police officers that were 
interviewed. The fact that it is a specialist 
posting was seen to be an additional motivation 
to volunteer their time. 
“There are a couple of Specials who will 
only do JRU shifts and I think my 
personal perception of that would be 
that we just need a bit more back bone 
in the Specials to say, ‘If you don’t do 
other shifts, then you will be removed 
from the JRU’. It’s always a fine line 
when you are dealing with volunteers, I 
guess, that you’ve got to be careful not 
to upset them too much.” – Special 
Constable 
 
“I struggle getting any hours in and I 
enjoy the JRU more so if I have to 
choose one or two shifts a month I will 
purposely chose JRU because I get more 
from it and I enjoy it more.” – Special 
Constable 
 
“It’s useful in that it’s staffed with 
volunteers so it engages them and 
encourages them to come to work, 
because the volunteer may not come to 
work on a Friday or Saturday, but they 
quite enjoy coming to work to work with 
the paramedic…” – Regular officer 
 
“The Special Constables do enjoy it. they 
keep coming back so I hope they enjoy 
it!  But they see it as a bit of a break 
from their normal, ‘city safe’ or the 
normal policing side of things, it’s a 
different aspect to it.” – Paramedic  
Furthermore, Specials involved in the JRU were 
very proud of their role within the operation and 
in several cases associated their identity as a 
volunteer as much with the JRU as with the 
wider Special Constabulary and Gwent Police. 
“For many of our Special Constables on 
the team, it has probably reinvigorated 
them in their commitment to the 
Specials and it has given them 
something really positive to be part of 
and to feel proud of.  That has been a 
real positive success for the Special 
Constabulary.” – Special Constable 
 
“And [regular officers] can see that 
we’ve got some clear purpose and that 
we perhaps know something that they 
don’t.  That’s the perception because we 
are a specialist unit.” – Special 
Constable 
 
“…because [Specials] been involved 
from day one, they still want to stay 
involved with the project because it is 
their project and without their support it 
would have folded a long time ago.” – 
Paramedic  
This presented a risk of inadvertently creating 
‘special Specials’ within the Special Constabulary 
and thereby causing division and resentment 
within the Special Constabulary.  
“…they don’t get the press or coverage 
that the JRU might get, so I would say 
there is a low-level rumbling resentment 
amongst those who are not on the 
JRU…” – Special Constable 
Additionally, there was a risk of deskilling 
Specials in their regular patrol duty skills. This 
was something that the Specials who operated 
at a more strategic level were conscious of and 
felt as though they had taken steps to prevent. 
“Because of the JRU, I have concerns 
that they de-skill in their regular 
Policing duties because there is actually 
very little Policing to do on the JRU.  
They don’t actually get involved in 
processes that they would have done if 
they were on response or doing 
neighbourhood policing.” – Special 
Constable 
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“…everyone wants to be on a specialist 
team, it’s exciting, but they need to 
prove that they are putting in the hours, 
doing the basic stuff before they go off 
and do something else.” – Special 
Constable 
Overall, the JRU provides opportunities for 
Special Constables to have a broader experience 
of emergency responding and provides welcome 
extra skills within the Special Constabulary. 
However, it will be important to remain 
conscious of how Specials who are not given the 
opportunity to being involved with the JRU 
respond, and whether any resentment or 
division is created. Importantly, strategic leads 
with the Special Constabulary were aware of 
these potential risks and were attempting to 
take steps to mitigate these. 
5.2.2 Expectations and abilities 
There were concerns that Specials’ expectations 
of an exciting shift working on the JRU, along 
with the specific interests and preferences of the 
paramedics, have led at times to them filtering 
out and not attending some of the less 
interesting sounding incidents and therefore not 
fulfilling the intended objective of the operation. 
Furthermore, training for Specials who are to be 
posted on the JRU is considered to be limitation, 
with most of the learning acquired over time 
through experience on shifts. Prolonged 
exposure to working with the paramedics 
eventually results in an understanding of the 
medical language and behaviours. 
The combination of a lack of clarity in how the 
JRU is tasked, which sometimes enables the JRU 
vehicle to select the incidents it attends, along 
with some Specials’ desire to have a more 
exciting volunteering experience (as discussed in 
the previous section) and the paramedic’s 
personal interests, can sometimes lead to the 
JRU vehicle attending only exciting-sounding 
incidents. Although there was no suggestion 
that this happens all of the time, it suggests that 
the expectations of the role of a Special on the 
JRU has perhaps not been universally 
understood. 
“…my perception was that it was being 
driven by the interest of the paramedic 
that I was out with at that time, who 
was very much into his trauma calls, and 
therefore the smaller, simpler tasks he 
wasn’t so keen on going to.” – Special 
Constable 
 
“…some Specials joined the Special 
Constabulary to be police officers, which 
is understandable and fair enough, and 
they’ve got no desire to be babysitting a 
paramedic for somebody who’s got half 
a broken bottle and has drunk a bottle 
of whisky… …we have to screen the 
applicants to make sure they are 
suitable for the sort of work ethic of the 
JRU and the intrinsic values that we 
have, which is that we’re not aiming to 
be the exciting, turning up at RTCs and 
stabbings and shootings unit.” – 
Paramedic  
Additionally, it was noted that although Specials 
must have achieved independent patrol status 
(IPS), there is very limited training in 
preparation for starting work on the JRU. There 
is no formal process of induction onto the 
operation. Instead, most of the knowledge and 
skills that Specials gain happens on shifts 
through experience of the incidents that they 
attend. This results in a growing disparity in the 
knowledge and capability of the Specials 
involved and could cause an increase in 
inconsistency in terms of performance the 
service provided. 
“There was initial training for some 
Officers that started on the Unit but all 
the Officers that have joined since that 
time haven’t received any additional 
training.” – Special Constable 
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“It was only provided to the original 
team.  So, any new Specials that have 
joined since, as far as I am aware, have 
not received that additional training.  
We only ever received the one training 
course.” – Special Constable 
 
“But some of us have been given a little 
bit more [training], some of us haven’t 
and we’ve only got the basic First Aid 
training that you get when doing your 
Officer Safety training” – Special 
Constable 
Among the Special Constables who were 
interviewed, there was an agreement that more 
training would be beneficial in making a bigger 
contribution to the JRU. Some specific areas for 
training were identified, including driving 
courses and method-of-entry training. 
“Where I do see a potential gap is that 
we as police officers, when we turn up 
to the calls we don’t have that little bit 
of extra First Aid training.” – Special 
Constable 
 
“we would like a bit more training 
where we could help a bit more and 
simply having a couple of extra tools 
with us that allow us to gain entry to 
people’s premises quicker than waiting 
for another officer, another specialist op 
unit to turn up.” – Special Constable 
 
“So I think that could be cleared up and 
we can alleviate some of the workload 
on the paramedic by doing a bit more of 
the driving.  Whether that’s just normal 
roads feeding between where we can or 
whether it’s some Specials have blue 
light training and they’re able to do that 
themselves.” – Special Constable 
This means that there is a period of time where 
Specials might experience a lack of 
understanding regarding what is expected of 
them on the JRU, especially at incidents. Over 
time though, it was reported that Specials had 
gained an in depth understanding of the 
language and behaviours of the paramedics, and 
some even obtained additional training and 
qualifications of their own volition, making them 
much more able to be effective in their role 
supporting the paramedic. 
“Off the back of this, a couple of the 
Specials have gone off and completed 
their Community First Responder 
training through the Welsh Ambulance 
Service, so this has then allowed them 
to start responding in their communities 
to benefit the ambulance service and 
obviously the patients that are 
accessing them.” – Paramedic 
 
“I think everybody on the team would 
say they have learned about the 
Paramedic world a lot better than they 
did before and have learned some 
medical skills as well. There are things 
you pick up simply by doing a shift with 
a Paramedic and seeing how they work.  
So, I would say there are a few soft 
skills that are developed subconsciously 
as well, that we don’t know we have 
learned.” – Special Constable 
This section highlights the lack of formal training 
and introduction to the JRU that currently exists. 
This is an important gap to fill and requires an 
investment of time and resource from both the 
police and the ambulance service if they want to 
better prepare Specials to be more effective in 
the role from their first shift on the JRU. The 
experience of Specials who have spent an 
extended period of time on the JRU 
demonstrates that an improved understanding 
of paramedics’ language and behaviours enables 
more effective collaborative working practices, 
and so to provide this understanding at an 
earlier stage would be beneficial for the 
operation. 
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5.1.3 Impact 
The JRU was considered to have had a range of 
significant impacts, including the skills and 
competencies of Specials, the perception of the 
value of the Special Constabulary to regular 
officers, winning awards, and providing an 
exciting and different role to promote 
recruitment to the Special Constabulary with. 
Additionally, it is important to consider the 
impact of the incidents that Specials attend on 
the JRU on the Specials themselves and whether 
they feel support is available to them. 
It was clear and obvious from the interviews 
with Special Constables that they felt as though 
they had benefitted from working on the JRU 
through the knowledge and skills they had 
acquired. Additionally, they felt that the work on 
the JRU was rewarding and that they could see 
the impact they were having, which was most 
acutely felt in terms of saving lives and 
preventing more serious injuries due to a quick 
response. 
“…a shard of glass ended up in this lad’s 
eye.  That wouldn’t have been an urgent 
red call, it would have been an amber 
call.  But because police were called and 
we were dispatched immediately, the 
paramedic was able to assess that 
individual and say he needs to go to 
hospital immediately.  We put him 
straight in the back of the car and we 
were down the hospital within 15 
minutes.  Whereas he could have been 
waiting an hour, lost the sight in his eye. 
But because of where we were and what 
we were doing, there was an 
instantaneous response.” – Special 
Constable 
 
“…personally, I’ve had a lot of mental 
health issues myself in the past so I’m 
good at connecting with other mental 
health patients, so that’s the thing I can 
do better than a lot of other Police 
Officers.” – Special Constable 
 
“…there is definitely also evidence, I 
would say, of the JRU actually physically 
saving lives and being there when 
another Unit may not have got there in 
time.” – Special Constable 
Additionally, there were a number of comments 
that recognised an improved relationship with 
regular officers through the work of the JRU, 
who had previously treated Special Constables 
as an inconvenience. This made Specials feel 
more valued by the police force generally. 
“It’s a great joint working exercise for 
our relationship with Welsh Ambulance 
Services.  It’s a great bonus spin off of 
this unit that as a Force we probably 
communicate better with WAST than we 
did before this Unit existed.  We have 
got good contacts and a good working 
relationship with them.” – Special 
Constable 
 
“…it does bring the services together.  
It’s a service that wasn’t there before, 
so it builds links and does share 
information, because they are out there 
with a Police radio and an Ambulance 
radio, listening to calls across both 
services and channels, so they can 
respond quickly to incidents.” – Regular 
officer 
 
“I think a strength has been that we’ve 
formed very close links with Gwent 
Police” – Paramedic  
The collaboration has earned Gwent Police 
awards, and these are excellent advertisements 
for the Special Constabulary and the impact that 
volunteering can have. It has helped Gwent 
Police to promote volunteering within the police 
as well as make arguments for increased 
investment in the operation. 
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“It’s won many awards – I’ve lost count 
of how many National and local awards 
that JRU has won.” – Regular officer 
 
“…it’s very important.  It’s won 
numerous awards for its innovation…” – 
Ambulance service 
However, Specials who have worked on the JRU 
did report that they had attended incidents 
involving things that they found traumatic, and 
that because they are volunteers and not 
regular officers, there was a lack of appreciation 
for the level of exposure to trauma that they 
experience. There was a suggestion that a 
review is needed of the debriefing process for 
volunteers, including provision of support. It was 
noted that because a Special Constable might 
not be on shift for another week, it was easy for 
more senior figures to either forget or not be 
aware of what incidents their team had attended 
on their previous shift. 
“…there is a threat that this particular 
Unit is heavy on the trauma, heavy on 
the sudden deaths, suicides, RTC’s and 
quite traumatic incidents.  There is a risk 
for Officers that they will suffer with 
mental health difficulties because of the 
relentless nature of the calls.  It’s a long 
shift – 12 hours of trauma really, all 
night long, and so I have a significant 
concern for some Officers who have 
been in this Unit for a long time and 
haven’t had the support they need to 
process that trauma.  So, there is some 
PTSD risk there.” – Special Constable 
 
“…very early on it became apparent to 
me that we didn’t have the right system 
in place to ensure that staff were feeling 
supported following the types of 
incidents they were going to.  As 
somebody who had been in many years 
and seen some quite horrific stuff, we 
did have some Specials who were quite 
young, quite naïve, also joining that Unit 
and the impact of seeing death and 
destruction week in, week out should 
never be downgraded.” – Special 
Constable 
 
“I’ve been to plenty of incidents where 
I’ve been torn from pillar to post and yet 
now checking up on me whatsoever.  
It’s bad really because if you were a 
Regular you would get it… …when you 
are there one minute and they don’t see 
you again they kind of forget about 
you.” – Special Constable 
Overall, the JRU has had a positive impact on 
the Specials who work on the operation and the 
wider force more generally. It is seen as an 
interesting and exciting way to make an 
immediate and almost tangible impact on the 
local area, and this is one of the key motivations 
for the Specials involved. A more formal process 
may be required though for monitoring the 
incidents attended to ensure that Specials who 
might require emotional support are not left 
unsupported.  
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6.1 Strengths 
• The JRU has saved lives and prevented 
serious injuries 
• The public get a faster response than 
they would normally get 
• Specials on the JRU are exposed to a 
wide variety of calls and get to know the 
force area very well 
• Specials increase the amount of skills and 
knowledge that they have 
• It has kept specials engaged and willing 
to volunteer 
• It releases police officers and 
ambulances to attend other incidents, 
thereby enabling both organisations to 
address more demand 
• It provides an appropriate method of 
conveyance for people in mental health 
distress 
• It has improved the relationship between 
Gwent Police and WAST 
• Communication between the two 
organisations has improved due to the 
collaboration 
6.2 Weaknesses 
• Stagnation – the JRU has not grown or 
developed since its initial 
implementation 
• Lack of support from middle-
management at WAST 
• Reliance on overtime from paramedics to 
ensure shifts go ahead 
• Lack of awareness and understanding in 
the control rooms of both police and 
ambulance services 
• No formal process for tasking and 
deployment allows for open 
interpretation regarding types of 
incidents attended 
• Insufficient data capturing processes in 
place to measure impact and evidence 
success 
• Inconsistent levels of training provided 
for specials on the JRU 
• No coordination or shared learning with 
other areas running JRU operations 
6.3 Opportunities 
• Provide specials with extra training and 
skills to make them more effective in 
their JRU role 
• Create a formal process for coordination 
between police and ambulance service 
control rooms. This could include having 
an ambulance service dispatcher in the 
police control room 
• Bring the JRU shift into the formal 
ambulance service rota process to 
ensure all shifts are staffed 
• Put in place systems to capture data 
around incidents attended, actions 
taken, and outcomes for patients as well 
as police officers and ambulances 
released back into workflow 
• Create links with other areas running 
JRU-style operations to share and benefit 
from learning  
• Create a management structure for the 
JRU across both organisations that 
results in buy-in from both sides as well 
as sustainable operational leadership 
6.4 Threats 
• WAST withdraw support due to lack of 
statistical evidence of impact and success 
and the JRU loses the paramedic and 
vehicle 
• Lack of new specials being added to the 
JRU team could threaten the future 
sustainability 
• Risk of specials losing interest due to 
uncertainty of shifts going ahead 
• Risk of PTSD/trauma, with processes for 
specials to receive support not in place 
• Remit could be considered too wide and 
therefore the value to specific incident 
types could be missed 
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7. Conclusions & 
Recommendations 
The data presented in this report shows Gwent 
Joint Response Unit was perceived positively, 
however, there was a strong feeling that it has 
the potential to be significantly more effective, 
and there are areas that require improvements 
if it is to maximise its potential. This chapter 
therefore provides a range of recommendations 
that should be considered achievable. 
The conclusions and recommendations (R) are 
split into operational performance of the JRU, 
looking at issues around collaborative working 
practices, followed by strategic conclusions 
focusing on direction, leadership and 
management of the operation across the partner 
organisations. 
7.1 Operational conclusions and 
recommendations 
There were many benefits of the JRU 
highlighted throughout the qualitative 
interviews, with particular focus on releasing 
police and ambulance assets to attend other 
incidents and providing a much quicker response 
to incidents that might otherwise be waiting 
hours for an ambulance to arrive. Special 
Constables who work on the JRU are passionate 
about its value and the impact that it has, both 
on the organisations involved and on the public 
and their communities. They find it rewarding 
and have developed knowledge and skills that 
would not have been accessible in their standard 
Special Constable duties.  
That said, there were significant issues raised in 
relation to difficulties encountered around 
tasking and deployment. The lack of 
understanding and awareness of the JRU in the 
force and ambulance control rooms was 
highlighted as a specific issue throughout the 
research interviews. In addition to this, there 
was a lack of clarity and coordination around 
which control room was ultimately responsible 
for deploying the JRU, which has led to 
confusion and a system of the JRU choosing 
which incidents to attend emerging. 
R: Give one control room responsibility for 
tasking and deployment of the JRU 
R: Join up the control room operations by 
bringing an ambulance dispatcher into the police 
control room, or vice versa depending on which 
control room has responsibility for the JRU 
R: Provide training and/or an awareness 
campaign for control room practitioners 
regarding what the JRU is and does, when it is 
available and how it should be deployed 
These measures should create clarity 
regarding the collaboration, as well as a 
joined-up approach to deployment that 
results in the JRU being dispatched 
effectively to the correct incidents. 
While there was broad agreement on what the 
purpose of the JRU is though, there were some 
mixed opinions regarding how the collaboration 
could be most effectively deployed to maximise 
its effectiveness. There were four incident types 
that accounted for a significant majority of the 
JRU’s deployments and these were assaults, 
psychiatric problems, traffic collisions, and 
overdoses. However, the JRU’s remit is to attend 
any and all incidents where the paramedic will 
require police attendance, or vice versa, 
meaning that there is no focus on trying to 
reduce a specific type of demand. 
Some of those interviewed suggested that the 
JRU could be more effective if it focused on just 
one or two incident types, although there was 
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no consensus on which incident types it should 
be.  
R: Define the scope and purpose of the JRU, 
considering a specialisation of incident types to 
give it a clearer purpose 
Developing a specialist purpose for the 
JRU may also help to embed the 
operation in the thinking of control room 
dispatchers, who either forget the JRU 
exists, or don’t know what kinds of 
incidents to deploy it to. 
A further frustration experienced by paramedics 
but impacting on the whole JRU operation has 
been how the paramedic assigned to the JRU 
has been staffed. As the JRU role is not in the 
paramedic rota and is only staffed through 
overtime, there have been occasions where the 
JRU has been non-operational due to lack of 
staffing. Figure 4.1 in chapter 4 show the 
declining trend in the proportion of shifts 
completed each month, and it was reported in 
the interviews that it has continued to be a 
common occurrence. It was felt that this 
reflected a lack of commitment within WAST 
towards to the collaboration and could be easily 
solved by adding the JRU role to the official 
WAST rota. It should be noted, however, that 
despite the qualitative perspectives, there is no 
data relating to the reason that that JRU shifts 
did not go ahead and therefore there is no 
available comparison between shifts cancelled 
due to Specials and shifts cancelled because of 
paramedics. 
R: Add JRU role to the paramedic rota within 
WAST to ensure that all JRU shifts are staffed 
Although this would solve the problem of 
shifts being cancelled due to the lack of 
a paramedic, it would place pressure on 
the Gwent Special Constabulary to 
ensure that all shifts are also staffed with 
a Special Constable. 
Training was an issue that Special Constables 
who work on the JRU felt strongly about, and 
there was a consensus that they had not 
received enough and that they would like more. 
Although Specials felt that they had acquired 
valuable skills and knowledge just through 
spending time with the paramedic and dealing 
with incidents that they wouldn’t otherwise 
encounter, it was felt that there were 
opportunities to contribute more to the 
collaboration if additional skills were acquired, 
specifically in relation to more advanced 
emergency first-aid, driving, and method-of-
entry. It should be noted that the issue of 
Specials driving the JRU vehicle is also 
dependent on WAST’s insurance policies. 
R: Work with WAST to review the training 
provided to Special Constables in the induction 
R: Review CPD training for Specials to increase 
skills and knowledge 
This training will not only make the JRU 
more effective in dealing with incidents, 
it will help Special Constables feel like a 
more valuable partner in the 
collaboration while potentially reducing 
demand on regular officers at certain 
incident-types. 
7.2 Strategic conclusions and 
recommendations 
There were considerable concerns regarding the 
strategic leadership of the JRU across the 
interviews, a number of which impact on the 
operational ability of the collaboration. 
One of the main themes that came through 
from the interviews was the perception that the 
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JRU has been drifting along without any real 
progress, development or growth since its 
introduction in 2016. Some of the comments 
pointed out that other areas had introduced 
similar JRUs more recently but were already 
more developed with multiple vehicles delivering 
the combined service. It was highlighted that 
there have been discussions in the past 
regarding investing in a second JRU vehicle, but 
that the plans were put on hold. It was also 
unclear how the JRU should develop, should the 
two organisations agree. Some referred to an 
additional vehicle, whereas there was discussion 
around whether it should be operational 7-days 
per week. 
So far, the driving force behind the JRU seems 
to be the higher-ranked Special Constables. 
However, their influence is limited, and the 
operation needs a proactive champion within the 
regular force to drive progress and develop the 
JRU in the future. 
R: Agree, between the two organisations, what 
the future of the JRU will be in terms of growth 
and development 
Contributing to the lack of direction of the JRU is 
the inability to statistically evidence its impact 
and therefore demonstrate its successes. Gwent 
Police and WAST require accurate information 
about what incidents the JRU attends, the 
actions it is taking, the pathways that patients 
are diverted to, and the outcomes. It would also 
be useful to create an agreed value framework 
so that both organisations can measure the 
cost-benefit of the operation. 
R: Introduce detailed data capturing systems for 
the JRU to document all deployments as well as 
details of pathways and outcomes 
R: Agree a value framework to measure the 
cost-benefit of the JRU to both organisations 
The introduction of these systems will 
enable strategic leaders to better 
understand the demand that the JRU 
addresses as well as its activity. It will be 
vital in making and justifying future 
decisions around necessary changes to 
the JRU. 
Finally, the middle-management of WAST were 
identified as a barrier to the JRU’s success and a 
potential risk to the future of the operation. It 
was agreed that there was a lack of buy-in from 
the managers responsible for assigning 
paramedics to the vehicle and that the JRU was 
perceived to be in competition with the 
traditional ambulance resources rather than an 
effective way of reducing demand on 
ambulances. There was a feeling that the 
organisations did not communicate well at the 
operational management level, and that 
rectifying this would help to ensure the future of 
the JRU is secure. 
R: Create a strategic board for the JRU involving 
operational and strategic management from 
both Gwent Police and WAST that meets on a 
regular basis to discuss practice and strategy for 
the operation 
This will provide an opportunity for 
managers to experience the shared 
understanding of organisational 
challenges facing both services while 
also reviewing and deciding upon best 
practice and giving the JRU the direction 
it requires to develop and grow. 
7.3 Final thoughts 
Overall, the Gwent’s JRU provides an innovative 
role for Special Constables to volunteer in. The 
specialist role has clearly become a motivating 
factor to keep volunteering for several Specials, 
providing a sense of purpose, achievement, and 
pride around their involvement with the award-
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winning operation. This must be viewed as a 
positive impact of the JRU, despite presenting 
some concerns about potential divisions within 
the Special Constabulary. 
The Special Constables involved are very 
passionate about the JRU, however, the vehicle 
has, at times, been operational only due to the 
good will of paramedics willing to take on 
overtime hours to staff it. This presents a 
significant risk to the future of the JRU, along 
with the lack of statistical data to demonstrate 
the impact and success of the JRU. Evidencing 
the achievements of the collaboration in this 
format will hopefully result in opportunities for 
the JRU to develop and grow, and will 
strengthen arguments for increased investment. 
Joint response collaborations are becoming 
increasingly common across England and Wales, 
and there is an opportunity to share learning 
with other areas in order develop common ideas 
around best practice in this emerging field, as 
well as considering the learning from the slightly 
more established field of mental health street 
triage, which shares many similar challenges 
and characteristics. 
Gwent’s JRU has demonstrated in this evaluation 
that it has great potential to be very valuable to 
both the police and ambulance serv ice. It now 
requires strong direction and leadership to reach 
its potential and to ensure its future. 
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